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Abstract: A fundamental assumption of theories of decision-making is that we detect 
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to monitor baseline synaptic transmission
(Fig. 4A). In wild-type slices, tetanic stimula-
tion of pathway S1 (100 Hz, 1 s) evoked
homosynaptic LTP together with a hetero-
synaptic depression of the neighboring S2
pathway. The addition of an A1 antagonist
(DPCPX, 800 nM) prevented heterosynaptic
depression (Fig. 4B). To control for effects of
enhanced baseline transmission that result in
the presence of DPCPX, we switched from
normal artificial cerebrospinal fluid (ACSF) to
one containing 2.4 mM Ca2þ and 0.6 mM
Mg2þ, which enhanced synaptic transmission
to 172 T 8.9% (n 0 3 slices) of that in control
mice. We still found heterosynaptic depression
to be intact (64.9 T 8.2%, n 0 3 slices) com-
pared to ACSF controls (72.0 T 8.6%, n 0 3
slices). To determine whether astrocytes medi-
ate adenosine-dependent depression, we re-
peated this study using dn-SNARE slices and
found a virtual absence of heterosynaptic de-
pression (Fig. 4C).
These studies place the astrocyte at cen-
ter stage in the control of adenosine. Glial-
released ATP, which is rapidly hydrolyzed to
adenosine, leads to a persistent synaptic sup-
pression mediated by A1 receptors. Because
adenosine is implicated in the control of wake-
to-sleep transitions (26, 27) as well as re-
sponses to hypoxia, the identification of the
central role of the astrocyte in regulating
this nucleoside offers mechanistic insights into
these processes.
The kinetics of ATP hydrolysis and aden-
osine accumulation provide a synaptic net-
work with unique spatiotemporal conditions
to control synaptic transmission. Fast-acting
synaptic transmitters such as g-aminobutyric
acid and glutamate have high-affinity uptake
systems in the vicinity of the synapse that
constrain the time and distance over which a
transmitter acts. Synaptic activation of an
astrocyte to release ATP removes these con-
straints, because it takes È200 ms before
adenosine begins to accumulate (28). This
provides time for ATP diffusion to distant
sites, where it depresses synaptic transmission
through accumulated adenosine, thereby pro-
viding a mechanism for cross-talk to distant
synapses. In addition to activity-dependent
actions, astrocytes, by persistently suppressing
excitatory synaptic transmission, enhance the
capability of synapses to express synaptic
plasticity. Thus, the integration of synaptic
activity by the astrocyte leads to a widespread
coordination of synaptic networks. By sup-
pressing excitatory transmission, astrocytes
regulate the degree to which a synapse may
be plastic, and during the induction of LTP,
astrocyte-derived adenosine depresses neigh-
boring unstimulated pathways.
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Failure to Detect Mismatches
Between Intention and Outcome
in a Simple Decision Task
Petter Johansson,1* Lars Hall,1*. Sverker Sikstro¨m,1
Andreas Olsson2
A fundamental assumption of theories of decision-making is that we detect
mismatches between intention and outcome, adjust our behavior in the face of
error, and adapt to changing circumstances. Is this always the case? We
investigated the relation between intention, choice, and introspection. Partic-
ipants made choices between presented face pairs on the basis of attractiveness,
while we covertly manipulated the relationship between choice and outcome
that they experienced. Participants failed to notice conspicuous mismatches
between their intended choice and the outcome they were presented with, while
nevertheless offering introspectively derived reasons for why they chose the way
they did. We call this effect choice blindness.
A fundamental assumption of theories of de-
cision making is that intentions and outcomes
form a tight loop (1). The ability to monitor
and to compare the outcome of our choices
with prior intentions and goals is seen to be
critical for adaptive behavior (2–4). This type
of cognitive control has been studied ex-
tensively, and it has been proposed that in-
tentions work by way of forward models (5)
that enable us to simulate the feedback from
our choices and actions even before we execute
them (6, 7).
However, in studies of cognitive control,
the intentions are often tightly specified by the
task at hand (8–10). Although important in
itself, this type of research may not tell us
much about natural environments where in-
tentions are plentiful and obscure and where
the actual need for monitoring is unknown.
Despite all its shortcomings, the world is in
many ways a forgiving place in which to
implement our decisions. Mismatches between
intention and outcome are surely possible, but
when we reach for a bottle of beer, we very
seldomly end up with a glass of milk in our
hands. But what if the world were less for-
giving? What if it instead conspired to create
discrepancies between the choices we make
and the feedback we get? Would we always
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be able to tell if an error were made? And if
not, what would we think, and what would
we say?
To examine these questions, we created a
choice experiment that permitted us to surrep-
titiously manipulate the relationship between
choice and outcome that our participants ex-
perienced. We showed picture pairs of female
faces to 120 participants (70 female) and asked
them to choose which face in each pair they
found most attractive. On some trials, imme-
diately after their choice, they were asked to
verbally describe the reasons for choosing the
way they did. Unknown to the participants, on
certain trials, a double-card ploy was used to
covertly exchange one face for the other (Fig.
1). Thus, on these trials, the outcome of the
choice became the opposite of what they in-
tended. Each subject completed a sequence of
15 face pairs, three of which were manipulated
(M). The M face pairs always appeared at the
same position in the sequence, and for each of
these pairs, participants were asked to state the
reasons behind their choice. Verbal reports
were also solicited for three trials of non-
manipulated (NM) pairs (11).
The experiment employed a 3-by-2,
between-group factorial design, with delibera-
tion time and similarity of the face pairs as
factors. For time, three choice conditions were
included: one with 2 s of deliberation time, one
with 5 s, and one where participants could take
as much time as they liked. Participants gen-
erally feel that they are able to form an opinion
given 2 s of deliberation time (supporting online
text). Nevertheless, the opportunity for partic-
ipants to enjoy free deliberation time was
included to provide an individual criterion of
choice. For similarity, we created two sets of
target faces, a high-similarity (HS) and a low-
similarity (LS) set (fig. S1). Using an interval
scale from 1 to 10, where 1 represents Bvery
dissimilar[ and 10 Bvery similar,[ the HS set
had a mean similarity of 5.7 (SD 0 2.1) and the
LS set a mean similarity of 3.4 (SD 0 2.0).
Detection rates for the manipulated pictures
were measured both concurrently, during the
experimental task, and retrospectively, through
a post-experimental interview (11) (supporting
online text). There was a very low level of
concurrent detection. With a total of 354 M
trials performed, only 46 (13%) were detected
concurrently. Not even when participants were
given free deliberation time and a set of LS
faces to judge were more than 27% of all trials
detected this way. There were no significant
differences in detection rate between the 2-s
and 5-s viewing time conditions, but there was
a higher detection rate in the free compared to
the fixed viewing time conditions Et(118) 0
2.17, P 0 G 0.05). Across all conditions, there
were no differences in detection rate between
the HS and the LS sets (Fig. 2A). In addition,
there were no significant sex or age differences
in detection rate. Tallying all forms of detec-
tion across all groups revealed that no more
than 26% of all M trials were exposed.
However, these figures are inflated even so.
The moment a detection is made, the outlook
of the participants changes: They become
suspicious, and more resources are diverted to
monitoring and control. To avoid such cascad-
ing detection effects, it is necessary to discard
all trials after the first detection is made. Figure
2B shows detection rates with this correction in
place. The overall detection rate was signifi-
cantly lower Et(118) 0 3.21, P G 0.005^, but
none of our prior conclusions are affected by
the use of this data set (the percentage of
participants that detected the manipulation is
shown in fig. S2).
Our experiment indicates that the relation-
ship between intentions and outcomes may
sometimes be far looser than what current theo-
rizing has suggested (6, 9). The detection rate
was not influenced by the similarity of the face
pairs, indicating the robustness of the finding.
The face pairs of the LS set bore very little
resemblance to each other, and it is hard to
imagine how a choice between them could be
confused (fig. S1 and supporting online text).
The overall detection rate was higher when
participants were given free deliberation time.
This shows the importance of allowing indi-
vidual criteria to govern choice, but it is not
likely to indicate a simple subjective threshold.
The great majority of the participants in the 2-s
groups believed themselves to have had enough
time to make a choice (as determined by post-
test interviews), and there was no difference in
the actual distribution of choices among the
pairs from fixed to free deliberation time.
Next, we examined the relationship be-
tween choice and introspective report. One
might suspect that the reports given for NM
and M trials would differ in many ways. After
all, the former reports stem from a situation
common to everyday life (revealing the
reasons behind a choice), whereas the latter
reports stem from a truly anomalous one (re-
vealing the reasons behind a choice one
manifestly did not make).
We classified the verbal reports into a
number of different categories that potentially
could differentiate between NM and M reports.
For all classifications, we used three independent
blind raters, and interrater reliability was
consistently high (supporting online text and
table S1). We found no differences in the num-
ber of empty reports (when participants were
unable to present any reasons at all) or in the
Fig. 1. A snapshot sequence of
the choice procedure during a
manipulation trial. (A) Partici-
pants are shown two pictures of
female faces and asked to choose
which one they find most at-
tractive. Unknown to the partic-
ipants, a second card depicting
the opposite face is concealed
behind the visible alternatives.
(B) Participants indicate their
choice by pointing at the face
they prefer the most. (C) The
experimenter flips down the
pictures and slides the hidden
picture over to the participants,
covering the previously shown
picture with the sleeve of his
moving arm. (D) Participants pick up the picture and are immediately asked to explain why they
chose the way they did.
Fig. 2. Percent detection, divided into deliberation time and similarity, for (A) all trials and (B)
trials corrected for prior detections. Sim, similar (HS); Dis, dissimilar (LS). Error bars indicate the
standard deviation of the means.
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degree to which reports were phrased in present
or past tense (which might indicate whether the
report is made in response to the present face or
the prior context of choice). Neither did the
length of the statements, as measured by number
of characters, differ between the two sets (NM 0
33, SD 0 45.4; M 0 38, SD 0 44.4), nor the
amount of laughter present in the reports (with
laughter being a potential marker of nervousness
or distress). We found significantly more dy-
namic self-commentary in the M reports
Et(118) 0 3.31, P G 0.005^. In this type of
commentary, participants come to reflect
upon their own choice (typically by question-
ing their own prior motives). However, even
in the M trials, such reports occurred infre-
quently (5% of the M reports).
We rated the reports along three dimensions:
emotionality, specificity, and certainty (using a
numeric scale from 1 to 5). Emotionality was
defined as the level of emotional engagement in
the report, specificity as the level of detail in the
description, and certainty as the level of con-
fidence in their choice the participants ex-
pressed. There were no differences between
the verbal reports elicited from NM and M trials
with respect to these three categories (fig. S3).
Seemingly, the M reports were delivered with
the same confidence as the NM ones, and with
the same level of detail and emotionality. One
possible explanation is that overall engagement
in the task was low, and this created a floor
effect for both NM and M reports. However,
this is unlikely to be the case. All three
measures were rated around the midline on
our scale (emotionality 0 3.5, SD 0 0.9;
specificity 0 3.1, SD 0 1.2; certainty 0 3.3, SD 0
1.1). Another possibility is that the lack of
differentiation between NM and M reports is an
indication that delivering an M report came
naturally to most of the participants in our task.
On a radical reading of this view, a suspicion
would be cast even on the NM reports. Con-
fabulation could be seen to be the norm and
truthful reporting something that needs to be
argued for.
To scrutinize these possibilities more close-
ly, we conducted a final analysis of the M re-
ports, adding a contextual dimension to the
classification previously used. Figure 3 shows
the percentage of M reports falling into eight
different categories. The Bspecific confab-
ulation[ category contains reports that refer
to features unique to the face participants
ended up with in a manipulated trial. As these
reports cannot possibly be about the original
choice (i.e., BI chose her Ethe blond woman^
because she had dark hair[), this would indeed
be an indisputable case of Btelling more than
we can know[ (12). Equally interesting is the
Boriginal choice[ category. These are reports
that must be about the original choice, because
they are inconsistent with the face participants
ended up with (i.e., BI chose her because she
smiled Esaid about the solemn one^[. Here,
despite the imposing context of the manipu-
lated choice, vestiges of the original inten-
tion are revealed in the M reports. Analogous
to the earlier example of confabulation, this
would be an unquestionable case of truthful
report.
In summary, when evaluating facial attract-
iveness, participants may fail to notice a radical
change to the outcome of their choice. As an
extension of the well-known phenomenon of
change blindness (13), we call this effect
choice blindness (supporting online text). This
finding can be used as an instrument to es-
timate the representational detail of the de-
cisions that humans make (14). We do not
doubt that humans can form very specific and
detailed prior intentions, but as the phenome-
non of choice blindness demonstrates, this is
not something that should be taken for granted
in everyday decision tasks. Although the cur-
rent experiment warrants no conclusions about
the mechanisms behind this effect, we hope it
will lead to an increased scrutiny of the concept
of intention itself. As a strongly counterintuitive
finding, choice blindness warns of the dangers
of aligning the technical concept of intention
too closely with common sense (15, 16).
In addition, we have presented a method for
studying the relationship between choice and
introspection. Classic studies of social psy-
chology have shown that telling discrepancies
between choice and introspection can some-
times be discerned in group-level response pat-
terns (12) but not for each of the individuals at
hand. In the current experiment, using choice
blindness as a wedge, we were able to Bget
between[ the decisions of the participants and
the outcomes with which they were presented.
Fig. 3. Frequency distribution of the contents of the M reports aligned along a rough continuum from
confabulatory to truthful report. Sample sentences (translated from Swedish) are drawn from the set
of reports for the displayed face pair. Letters in brackets indicate whether the report was given by a
male (M) or a female (F) participant. The specific confabulation (Conf.) category contains reports that
refer to features unique to the face participants ended up with in an M trial. The detailed and
emotional confabulation categories contain reports that rank exceptionally high on detail and emo-
tionality (94.0 on a scale from 1 to 5). The simple and relational confabulation categories include
reports where the generality of the face descriptions precluded us from conclusively associating them
with either of the two faces (i.e., everybody has a nose, and a personality). The category of uncertainty
contains reports dominated by uncertainty (G2 on a scale from 1 to 5). The dynamic reports are
reports in which participants reflect upon their own choice, and the final category contains reports
that refer to the original context of choice.
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This allowed us to show, unequivocally, that
normal participants may produce confabula-
tory reports when asked to describe the reasons
behind their choices. More importantly, the
current experiment contains a seed of system-
aticity for the study of choice and subjective
report. The possibility of detailing the proper-
ties of confabulation that choice blindness
affords could give researchers an increased
foothold in the quest to understand the pro-
cesses behind truthful report.
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Sexual Selection Can Resolve
Sex-Linked Sexual Antagonism
Arianne Y. K. Albert* and Sarah P. Otto
Sexual selection is a potent evolutionary force. However, very few models
have considered the evolution of female preferences for traits expressed in
both sexes. Here we explore how female preferences coevolve with sexually
antagonistic traits, which involve alleles that are beneficial to one sex but
harmful to the other. We show that with a sexually antagonistic trait on the X
chromosome (males XY, females XX), females evolve to prefer mates carrying
alleles beneficial to daughters. In contrast, with a Z-linked trait (males ZZ,
females ZW), females more often evolve mating preferences for mates car-
rying alleles beneficial to sons (that is, flashy displays).
Evolutionary biologists have long puzzled over
how and why female preferences drive the
evolution of exaggerated male traits. General-
ly, female preferences are thought to enhance a
female_s long-term fitness by increasing her
offspring_s fitness, either directly or through
genetic associations between preference and
trait loci (1, 2). Nearly all models assume that
females do not initially express the male dis-
play trait, or else they assume that the fitness
effects are the same in males and females (3).
However, traits subject to sexual selection will
often be sexually antagonistic, for example,
with Bsexy[ male traits benefiting males but
reducing female fitness (4–6). If a trait in-
creases male reproductive success at the cost
of female viability, females must then choose
between having attractive sons (and unfit
daughters) and having ugly sons (but un-
encumbered daughters). As long as females
can detect the genotypic differences among
males at sexually antagonistic loci, we expect
mating preferences to evolve as described by
the models explored here.
Theory predicts that sexually antagonistic
loci are more likely to remain polymorphic on
the sex chromosomes (4, 5). Furthermore, re-
cent empirical work suggests that many sex-
ually selected traits in animals are located on
the X chromosome (7, 8) and that most poly-
morphic sexually antagonistic traits are located
on the X chromosome in Drosophila (5, 9).
There is also evidence to suggest that a female_s
mate choice may result in a tradeoff in the
fitness between her daughters and sons (10).
Several recent theoretical examinations of
the evolution of female preferences have
explored sex linkage of the trait and/or pref-
erence (11–14). However, these models, with
the exception of Reeve and Pfennig_s (12),
assume that sexually selected traits have male-
limited expression and therefore no fitness
consequences when in females, and none has
addressed sexual antagonism. Here we address
the question of how female preferences evolve
for traits that have contrasting fitness effects in
each sex.
With sexual antagonism, chromosomal loca-
tion should strongly affect the evolution of
female preferences. Simply put, an X-linked
male trait is never passed on from an attractive
father to his sons, whereas his daughters suffer
the cost of carrying the display trait (5, 9).
Offspring in XY species therefore do not gain
a fitness benefit from females preferring males
with a more extreme X-linked display trait. In
contrast, both males and females contribute a
Z chromosome to sons in ZW species. Thus,
females preferring a Z-linked display trait
receive the fitness benefit of sexy sons, even
though their daughters suffer a fitness cost
(5, 9). This cost is lessened by the fact that
daughters inherit only one of their father_s Z
chromosomes. With autosomal inheritance,
these asymmetries in inheritance are absent.
To verify the verbal argument laid out above,
we present the results of two-locus models that
follow the fate of a newly arisen preference
allele p in a population that is at a polymorphic
equilibrium at a trait locus. We assume that
Table 1. Male and female fitness components in male heterogametic (XY) and female heterogametic
(ZW) species.
X-linked trait Z-linked trait
Male trait
T t TT Tt tt
Female preference PP 1 1 þ aPP P 1 1 þ daP 1 þ aP
Pp 1 1 þ aPp p 1 1 þ dap 1 þ ap
pp 1 1 þ app
Male viability 1 – sy 1 1 – sz 1 – hsz 1
Female trait
TT Tt tt T t
Female viability 1 1 – hsx 1 – sx 1 1 – sw
Female preference
PP Pp pp P p
Female cost 1 – kaPPkk 1 – kaPpkk 1 – kappkk 1 – kaPkk 1 – kapkk
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Material and Methods 
 
Participants 
One hundred and twenty participants (70 female) participated in the study (mean age ± SD, 
26 ± 8.3). Participants were drawn from a mixed student and non-student population. As a 
cover story for the experiment participants were told that the experimenters were interested 
in choice and facial attractiveness. After the experiment participants were debriefed about 
the true nature of the design, and given the opportunity to voice any concerns. All 
participants then gave informed consent. Two participants were removed from the 
subsequent analysis because they were immediately able to discern how the card trick was 
performed (due to flawed presentations by the experimenter). 
 
Experimental Procedure 
Participants were shown pairs of grayscale pictures of female faces, and were given the 
evaluative task of choosing which face in each pair they found most attractive. In addition, 
on some trials, immediately after the choice, they were asked to verbally describe the 
reasons for choosing the way they did. Participants had been informed in advance that we 
would solicit verbal reports about their intentions during the experiment, but not the 
specific trials for which this was the case. Unknown to the participants, on certain trials, a 
double-card ploy was used to covertly exchange one face for the other. Thus, on these 
trials, the outcome of the choice became the opposite of what they intended.  
 The experiment employed a three by two factorial design, with deliberation time and 
similarity of the face-pairs as factors. For time, three choice conditions were included: one 
with two seconds of deliberation time, one with five, and a final condition where 
participants could take as much time as they liked.  
 For similarity, we created two sets of target faces, a high similarity (HS) and a low 
similarity set (LS). Using an interval scale from 1–10 where 1 represents “very dissimilar” 
and 10 “very similar”, the HS set had a mean similarity of 5.7 (SD=2.08), and the LS a 
mean similarity of 3.4 (SD=2.00). The face pictures were collected from the The 
Psychological Image Collection at Stirling (PICS), online face database 
(http://pics.psych.stir.ac.uk/). We used pictures from the Nottingham and the Stirling 
collection, and 15 face-pairs were constructed on the basis of a rough matching of the 
photos (position of the head, background luminance, background color, attractiveness, etc.). 
After this, a group of independent raters (n=15) coded all pairs for similarity, and six pairs 
were selected for the HS and LS set. 
 Each participant completed a sequence of 15 face-pairs, three of which were 
manipulated. The manipulated face-pairs always appeared at the same position in the 
sequence (7, 10, 14), and in the same order. For all of these pairs participants were asked to 
state the reasons behind their choice. All reports were recorded and later transcribed. To 
provide a comparison class, verbal reports were also solicited for three trials of non-
manipulated pairs. The non-manipulated (NM) and manipulated (M) pairs were counter-
balanced during the experiment (with the LS set serving as non-manipulated control in the 
HS-groups, and equally the other way around).  
 Using standard change blindness terminology, this task would be described as 
involving incidental change detection, one-shot stimulus presentation, and occlusion-
contingent change (1). The period the hidden picture remained unseen on the table during 
the switch was approximately 2s from drop-down to pick-up (with some variations due to 
natural arm movements). 
 Detection rates for the manipulated pictures were measured both concurrently and 
retrospectively, with three graded levels of detection being used for our analysis. A trial 
was classified as concurrently detected if participants showed any signs of detection during 
the switch (such as explicitly reporting that the faces had been switched, or indicating that 
something went wrong with their choice). After the experiment all participants were asked 
a series of increasingly specific questions in a post-test interview to investigate whether 
they had any inkling that something had gone wrong (“What did you think about the 
experiment?”, “Did you find anything odd with the experiment?” and “Did you notice 
anything strange with the stimuli presented in the experiment?”). Participants that revealed 
no signs of detection in this procedure were then presented with a hypothetical scenario 
describing an experiment in which the faces they choose between are surreptitiously 
switched (i.e. the very experiment they had just participated in), and asked whether they 
thought they would have noticed such a change. This question was included to determine 
the folk-psychological status of our design (i.e. whether it would be perceived as counter-
intuitive or not). Finally, all participants were debriefed about the true nature of the design, 
and asked if they had noticed anything in the experiment resembling the switches that we 
had just described. If they answered “no” to this question, we concluded that they did not 
consciously notice any of the manipulations made during the experiment. All other 
participants were then given an opportunity to sort through their chosen pictures and 
indicate which faces they felt could have been manipulated. A trial was classified as 
retrospectively detected if participants picked out the corresponding manipulated picture in 
the set. If participants did so, but also indicated any number of false positives, those trials 
were classified in a category called possible retrospective detection. The inclusion of this 
category in the analysis was meant to compensate for the possibility of underreporting due 





Detection Criteria  
Taken together we believe the three categories of detection in our experiment gave the 
participants a fair chance to voice their concerns, and that they go a long way towards 
ensuring that no conscious detections were left out. In devising a cued-procedure (i.e. 
allowing participants to sort through their chosen faces) for the retrospective detection test, 
and the inclusion of participants that even named false positives in the possible 
retrospective detection category, we tried to err on the side of being too liberal about what 
to count (for example, if we had terminated our post-test interview after the initial question 
about whether participants experienced anything odd during the experiment, only a single 
retrospective detection would have been registered).  
 However, when discussing detection criteria it is very difficult to remain neutral with 
respect to different theories of consciousness. For our concurrent detection criterion we 
relied on spontaneous verbal report by the participants (even if we did not demand an 
articulate response). But why should we give special status to verbal reports? According to 
a prominent tradition in the field of implicit learning we should always be looking for the 
most exhaustive measure of conscious processing (2-4), otherwise we might end up 
establishing false dissociations between differentially sensitive measures of the same 
conscious resource. This methodological principle has been dubbed the sensitivity criterion 
(4). 
 The customary way of adhering to the sensitivity criterion is to use concurrent forced-
choice to measure conscious detection (5). Applied to the current experiment this method 
would probably have resulted in more instances of detected manipulations than the 
spontaneous reporting we relied on. However, as we see it, there is a substantial difference 
between being unaware of a specific influence in a natural context, and being similarly 
unaware of some stimuli, influence, or process under the most penetrating probe (i.e. what 
the sensitivity criterion prescribes). The experiment was meant to simulate a choice 
situation in which no prior evidence indicates that a high level of monitoring is needed, and 
it is only very rarely that natural conversations are accompanied by clever simultaneous 
forced choice questions and reaction time measures to exhaustively probe our conscious 
knowledge.  
 Of course, any attempt at an ecological explanation of decision making would have to 
accommodate both non-vigilant (relaxed, non-suspicious), as well as vigilant (guarded, 
suspicious) choice. Depending on whether the correction for prior detection is applied in 
our experiment it can be seen to occupy different positions along this dimension, with the 
uncorrected version situated further towards the suspicious pole. Had our experiment been 
framed as an explicit detection task, we have no doubt that most participants would have 
been able to spot the manipulations immediately. 
 
Previous Studies 
Before implementing our main experiment we ran a series of basic studies exploring the 
phenomenon of choice blindness. These studies add to the evidential base of the current 
experiment by demonstrating the effect in a different medium and with a different design, 
and with different types of stimuli.  
 First, we created an experiment in which participants had to choose which one of two 
abstract patterns presented on a computer screen they found most aesthetically appealing 
(the patterns were collected from various websites containing ‘artistic’ computer wallpaper 
for non-commercial use). Each trial began when the participants clicked on a left-aligned 
start-icon that made the two patterns appear on the right side of the screen. Participants 
were given 1500 ms to consider their choice, then an alerting sound was played, and they 
had to move the cursor to the preferred pattern. In addition, we required the cursor 
trajectory to the target pattern to pass through one of two small, color-coded, intermediate 
squares corresponding to either the upper or the lower pattern on the right. When the 
participants passed through one of these squares, the entire screen flashed in matching color 
for 50 ms. Similarly to the current experiment, on some trials, a mismatch between choice 
and outcome was created. On a manipulated trial, the attention-grabbing properties of the 
midway square and the 50 ms screen flash were used to conceal the fact that the two choice 
alternatives switched places while the participants were moving the cursor across the 
screen. The full experiment consisted of 15 trials, three of which were manipulated. Twenty 
participants (12 female) were tested. In total, counting both concurrent and retrospective 
detections (and using data uncorrected for prior detections), 19% of the manipulated trials 
were detected.   
 In a subsequent experiment we used the same decision paradigm, but instead of 
abstract patterns we used female faces to choose between (as with the current experiment, 
the PICS online face database was used for the selection). In addition, immediately after 
their choice participants were asked to state their reasons for choosing the way they did. 
The experiment consisted of 30 trials, five of which were manipulated. Twenty-two 
participants (14 female) were tested, and the total detection rate was 32%. However, with 
five manipulated trials used rather than three, prior detection made a larger impact on the 
detection rate. Using corrected data, detection rate drops to 20% (this can also be seen in 
the fact that 9 out of 22 participants did not detect any of the five manipulations). Analysis 
of the verbal reports revealed similar patterns as in our main experiment, with no clear 
differentiation between the NM and M-reports.  
 Finally, we used the same setup as in the previous experiment, but with a set of male 
faces to choose between (again, the faces were collected from the PICS database). In 
addition, eye-tracking was used to verify that participants attended to the pictures both 
during the deliberation phase, and when giving their verbal reports. Eighteen participants 
(12 female) were tested, and total detection rate was 37% (29%, when corrected for prior 
detection). Analysis of the eye-tracking data revealed that participants attended to the 
pictures both before and after their choice. Again, analysis of the verbal reports revealed no 
differences between the NM and M-trials. 
 Throughout the whole series of studies, and in pilot controls, we conducted post-
experiment interviews to determine the subjective confidence participants felt about their 
choices. While opinion about whether the task was difficult or not fluctuated somewhat, a 
great majority of the participants believed 1500 ms was enough time to make a proper 
choice.   
 
Choice Blindness Blindness 
When we claim that it is hard to believe how a choice between the face-pairs in our study 
could be confused, we are not simply asking our readers to inspect the pairs in Fig. S1 and 
form their own opinions. During the post-test interview in the experiment we requested all 
participants that had not yet voiced any suspicion to consider a hypothetical choice-
manipulation extension of our experiment (see above, experimental procedure) and asked 
them if they believed they would have noticed such a change. The result shows that of the 
participants in our study that failed to notice any of the manipulations, 84% believed that 
they would have been able to do so (a result comparable to similar metacognitive probes in 
the change blindness literature (6, 7). Accordingly, many participants also showed 
considerable surprise, even disbelief at times, when we debriefed them about the true nature 
of the design. This effect of “choice blindness blindness” was also evident in our earlier 
computer-based experiments, with roughly 87% percent of participants claiming that they 
would have noticed if the outcome of their choice had been manipulated in the hypothetical 
experiment we described. 
 
Analysis of the Introspective Reports 
Analysis of verbal reports often proceeds in several iterations, where the early rating results 
are used to distill a more distinct and consistent categorization (8-10). The contrastive 
analysis we employed to analyze potential differences between the NM and M-trials, were 
based on a two-stage classification of the verbal reports of our participants. As the NM-
reports stem from a situation common to everyday life, while the M-reports are produced in 
response to a truly anomalous experimental probe, it would be natural to suspect that the 
two types of reports would differ in many ways. To investigate this, we identified four 
simple variables, based on ‘surface’ features of the reports (empty reports, laughter, the 
length of the reports, and the tense of the reports), and four promising psychological 
dimensions (emotionality, specificity, certainty, and dynamic self-reference). For all of 
these items common sense would suggest that the NM- and M-reports ought to be 
differentiated: participants in the M-trials ought to be more likely to say “I don’t know”, or 
“I have no idea”, when asked to state the reasons behind a choice they did not make (empty 
reports); they ought to give shorter reports (length of report); they ought to produce more 
nervous laughter or giggle in response to the unfamiliarity of the situation (laughter); and 
they ought to make more references to past tense in their reports, talking about what they 
thought in relation to the original context of choice, rather than what they think about the 
picture they are seeing now (tense of report); participants in the M-trials ought also to show 
less emotional engagement, as the M-reports are given in response to the alternative they 
did not prefer (emotionality); they ought to make less specific and detailed reports, as no 
prior reasons have been formulated for the manipulated alternative (specificity); they ought 
to express less certainty about their choice (certainty), and they ought to reflect more about 
the current choice situation, and engage in more dynamic self-commentary, typically by 
questioning their own prior motives (dynamic report). 
Independent raters first made untrained judgments for the classifications and 
dimensions we had identified (except length of report, which we calculated using the 
spreadsheet software). Each rater coded the whole set of reports. Three raters coded the 
four simple variables, and we used another three raters for the more complex scales. Next, 
we consulted with the group of raters, and used their input to sharpen our criteria and to 
calibrate our scales. Then a second group of (3+3) independent raters was given the same 
task. Before the new rating procedure each rater was provided with a training kit containing 
definitions and examples (available upon request from the authors). The approximate 
amount of training and instruction given to the raters ranged from fifteen minutes for the 
simple categories, to approximately 45 minutes for the psychological dimensions. This 
procedure resulted in good interrater agreement (see discussion below).  
The final contextual analysis proceeded somewhat differently. Here, we were 
interested in investigating the relation between the content of the M-reports and the picture 
they were presented with at the time of the report. More specifically, raters were given the 
task of classifying whether the reports contained references to unique or distinguishing 
features of one of the two faces in each pair – i.e. whether the report was about a particular 
face. As with the other categorizations, this task was first given to three independent raters, 
then calibrated, and then given to another three raters for a final classification. However, as 
we wanted the classification to be unquestionable, we only included instances of reports in 
the final analysis for which the raters had absolute agreement.  
The introspective reports collected in our experiment are rich and varied, and it is 
important not only to search for differences between the NM- and M-reports, but also to 
provide a descriptive representation of the content of these reports. In Fig. 3 we plot the 
frequency of eight different categories for the M-reports, laid out in a rough continuum 
between confabulatory and truthful report. The figure is built around epistemic ‘anchor 
points’ at each end (i.e. the categories ‘specific confabulation’ and ‘original choice’, for 
which we can be certain that the reports are either confabulatory or truthful), and then 
reports are collated according to the degree to which they are likely candidates to be 
confabulations. For example, a report saying “[I chose her] because she has a nice face” is 
placed at the center of the continuum. A report of this kind contains no information that 
allows us to assign it to either of the two choice alternatives (i.e. everybody has a face; it is 
not a distinguishing feature). Also, it has no additional interesting properties, like a strong 
emotional component, or a high degree of specificity. There are good reasons to believe this 
report in fact is a confabulation (after all, it is produced in direct response to a face the 
participant manifestly did not choose), but the content of the report gives no further clues 
about whether this is the case. In contrast, a report that is highly emotional, like “I simply 
love this girl”, represents a more severe mismatch between the actual choice and the 
manipulated outcome, and is placed closer to the confabulatory pole. On the other hand, a 
report that is devoid of any content, like “I don’t know”, or “I can’t tell”, is marked by 
uncertainty, and is therefore placed further towards the truthful pole.  
As mentioned above, a great strength of our methodology is that it allows for us to 
detect categories of reports in the M-trials that undoubtedly refer to the manipulated picture 
(“specific confabulation”) or the original context of choice (“original choice”). But 
currently there is no way to make these distinctions for the NM-reports, which preclude any 
comparisons between NM- and M-reports for these two categories. The categorization in 
Figure 3 is mutually exclusive, and weighted by proximity to the two poles. Reports were 
first placed in the two outmost categories, then in the category of dynamic report, then in 
detailed confabulation, then according to emotionality, then uncertainty, and finally the rest 
of the reports were divided into the simple and relational categories. As we see it, the 
resulting distribution gives a highly interesting impression of the contents of the M-reports, 
revealing the variable nature of, and the varying tendencies for, truthful and confabulatory 
report by our participants.  
To measure interrater reliability (IRR) we used Pearson’s product moment correlation 
as our main index. Table S1 shows the IRR levels for all variables and dimensions used in 
our analysis. The IRR is based on the average of the pair-wise Pearson product moment 
correlations between the three raters. Pearson’s r is a well-established index that measures 
internal consistency and covariation between raters. As we were mainly interested in 
investigating potential differences between the two classes of reports (NM and M), a 
covariation index is appropriate to use. However, it should be noted that estimates of IRR 
may fluctuate between different measurements. In the words of (9).: “Despite all the effort 
that scholars, methodologists, and statisticians have devoted to developing and testing 
indices of intercoder reliability, there is no consensus on a single ‘best’ index” (p. 593). As 
(9) contend, it is advisable to calculate IRR using more than one measure, and to 
demonstrate consistency across measures. Thus, although r is a commonly applied statistic 
for estimating the IRR, we have also chosen to include calculations based on Intra Class 
Correlation (ICC), and Krippendorff’s Alpha (see Table S1). The ICC is a measure widely 
endorsed to estimate IRR when ratings from more than two judges are considered (11, 12). 
We based our ICC on a two-way ANOVA, treating both the targets (verbal reports) and the 
raters as the random factors. Because systematic differences among levels of ratings were 
considered relevant, a measure of absolute agreement was chosen. In the terminology 
proposed by Shrout and Fleiss (13), we computed a case 2 model with three raters (ICC2,3). 
Krippendorff’s Alpha is a chance corrected index of absolute agreement, which generally is 
considered to be a ‘conservative’ measurement of IRR (9, 14). As with the methods used to 
calculate IRR, there are no absolute standards about what constitutes acceptable levels of 
reliability (9), but as a result primarily intended for research purposes, our IRR levels must 
be considered high (14-16). 
 
From Change Blindness to Choice Blindness 
It has been known for a long time that human participants are inept at noticing changes in a 
visual scene when the transients accompanying that change no longer convey information 
about its location, a phenomenon that has been termed change blindness (17). During the 
last decade the phenomenon of change blindness has generated an extraordinary amount of 
interest among researchers interested in the workings of the human visual system (1), 
particularly with reference to the mechanisms of attention (18), and the nature of visual 
consciousness (19). But despite this, the full potential of change blindness as a tool for 
studying the human mind is far from realized. Why should change blindness only be used 
to study distinctly visual aspects of human cognition? (1) writes: “the study of change 
detection has evolved over many years, proceeding through phases that have emphasized 
different types of stimuli and different types of tasks. All studies, however, rely on the same 
basic design. An observer is initially shown a stimulus… a change of some kind is made to 
this stimulus… and the [visual detection] response of the observer is then measured (p. 251, 
our emphasis)”. We were interested in the possibility of modifying this basic design to 
incorporate other non-perceptual elements of cognition. In particular, we wanted to 
investigate the relationship between intention, choice, and introspection. Our approach 
involves embedding different forms of change-manipulations in simple decision tasks and 
concurrently probe participants about the reasons for their choice. We see three main 
reasons for why this constitutes a novel and significant extension of the change blindness 
literature.   
Firstly, choice blindness brings the conceptual tools of change blindness from the 
basic study of perception into a new domain of inquiry. Research on change blindness has 
occasionally contained elements of interaction (most notably, the real-person interactions in 
20, 21), and at least one task in which the actions of the participants have functional 
relevance has been investigated (22), but ours is the first study to incorporate meaningful 
decision making in an evaluative task. In change blindness experiments participants are 
usually more likely to notice changes when they concern features of particular relevance to 
the scene, or if they are of central interest to the participants, or if the participants are 
particularly knowledgeable about them (1, 23). For choices it would almost seem to be a 
defining feature that they concern properties of high relevance and interest, or things we are 
very knowledgeable about. But in the current experiment, in the great majority of trials, our 
participants were blind to the mismatch between choice and outcome. While intending to 
choose X (a central-interest, non-peripheral, valenced stimuli), they failed to take notice 
when ending up with Y. This is a result that ought to be surprising even to the most 
seasoned change blindness researcher. On a more general level, we believe decision making 
to be domain with immediate intuitive appeal. There can be no doubt that we often care 
deeply about what we choose. The fact that we may be blind to the outcome of these 
choices is a finding that potentially could change our most intimate conceptions of 
ourselves as decision makers. 
Secondly, choice blindness can be used to study introspection and preference change. 
Looking at the wider methodological aspects of our work, we believe choice blindness 
opens up exiting new opportunities for research. During the course of a normal day humans 
make countless choices: some slow and deliberate, some rapid and intuitive, some that 
carry only minor significance, and some that impact greatly on our lives. But for all the 
intimate familiarity we have with everyday decision making, it is very difficult to probe the 
representations underlying this process, or to determine what we can know about them from 
the ‘inside’, by reflection and introspection (24-26). The greatest barrier for scientific 
research in this domain is the nature of subjectivity. How can researchers ever corroborate 
the reports of the participants involved, when they have no means of challenging them? As 
philosophers have long noted, incorrigibility is a mark of the mental (27). Who are they to 
say what my reasons are? But as we have shown in the current analysis, choice blindness 
can be used to investigate the properties of introspective report. Beyond the exploratory 
work reported here, we envisage the collection and construction of large scale databases of 
reports given in relation to NM- and M-trials. By varying stimulus, personality and 
situational dimensions within the body of reports, powerful systematic comparisons 
between NM- and M-reports will become possible (both hypothesis-based and of a more 
data-driven nature). It is our belief that this will allow researchers to find patterns of 
reporting that will enable them to say something about the general properties of 
introspective reports, something no other current method is able to reveal. However, this is 
not the only methodological possibility afforded by the phenomenon of choice blindness. 
For example, by extending our basic design to incorporate repeated decisions in longer 
series of trials, choice blindness can be used to gain insight into the interplay between 
decision and feedback, choice and report, attitude and outcome. In this vein we have shown 
how feedback from M-trials can induce preference change, and how this bias of future 
choices relates to the introspective reports given in the experimental situation (28).  
Thirdly, different mechanisms may underlie choice blindness and change blindness. 
Given that the current behavioral study was not designed to address the neuro-cognitive 
underpinnings of either choice or change blindness, it would be premature to offer any 
speculations whether they indeed are identical. However, as we see it, our experiment is 
perfectly positioned to bridge the disconnected research areas of choice/intentionality and 
change blindness, and to create some productive friction between the two. This can be seen 
clearly by a brief exposition of what intentional choice is supposed to entail. (29) write: 
“voluntary action implies a subjective experience of the decision and the intention to act… 
For willed action to be a functional behavior, the brain must have a mechanism for 
matching the consequences of the motor act against the prior intention” (p. 80, our 
emphasis, see also 30-32). But if this is the case, how can it be that the participants in our 
study often failed to detect the glaring discrepancy between the prior intention and the 
outcome of their choice? Matching this question with the most common explanations for 
change blindness offered in the literature does not seem to produce any satisfactory 
answers. In fact, in our view, given the almost complete lack of reference to mechanisms of 
decision making and intentionality in the change blindness literature, choice blindness 
would be an even more remarkable phenomenon if it turned out to be qualitatively identical 
to change blindness.  
For example, the prevalence of choice blindness in our experiment might be due to a 
failure to sufficiently encode the choice alternatives during the deliberation phase (33). But 
from the perspective of a decision researcher it would amount to a strangely maladaptive 
decision process not to encode the features that are supposed to be the very basis of the 
choice, or the gross identity of the two alternatives (at the very least, this should hold for 
the condition with free viewing time, where the participants themselves set the criteria for 
when to terminate the deliberation). Another option is that the intentions simply are 
forgotten during the two second interval when the card is switched. But intentions are not 
supposed to be instantly forgotten. As (29) contend, they are supposed to be the guiding 
structures behind our actions (and phenomenologically speaking, this is what many people 
claim them to be), which makes this option equally unattractive to decision theorists. 
Similar things can be said for the other common explanations for change blindness: that 
initial representations might be disrupted or overwritten by the feedback (34), that change 
blindness results from a failure to compare pre- and post-change information (35, 36), or 
that explicit change detection is impossible because the representations are in a format 
inaccessible to consciousness (37). They are all viable candidates to explain choice 
blindness, but also more or less incompatible with popular theories of choice and 
intentionality. If our task can be seen as a good example of willed action, involving 
perfectly standard intentions and choices (and currently we can see no reason why this 
should not be the case), but the outcome of the experiment could be fully explained by the 
conceptual apparatus of change blindness research, then something would seem to be 




















Fig S1. The face-pairs used for the manipulated trials in the experiment, with similarity scores displayed 






















Fig S2. Percentage of subjects across the different conditions failing to detect all manipulations (black bars), 






Fig S3. The content of the verbal reports rated along the dimensions of (A) emotionality, (B) specificity, and 
(C) certainty. As can be gleaned from the figure, no significant differences between the non-manipulated and 
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